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DEMOCRACY AT WORK: THE SIXTH CIRCUIT UPHOLDS THE RIGHT OF THE
PEOPLE OF CINCINNATI TO CHOOSE THEIR OwN MORALITY IN EQUAuTY
FOUNDATION OF GREATER CiNCNNAT, INC V. CTY OF CINCINNATI, 128 F.3D 289
(6TH CI. 1997)
I. INTRODUCTION
The gay-rights movement, which has grown in power and influence over the last
few decades, can no longer proclaim political powerlessness.' The great
proliferation of gay-rights groups and anti-discrimination laws and policies
demonstrate this.2 Gay-rights organizations have had much success in promoting
an agenda of tolerance and non-discrimination across America. 3 The gay-rights
movement, however, has since changed its goals from societal tolerance of
homosexuals to outright acceptance,4 even to the extent of legalizing same-sex
' In at least 18 states and 165 communities, gay-rights supporters have succeeded by
convincing legislatures, or through popular referendums, to pass laws prohibiting
discrimination aimed at gay, lesbian, and bisexual lifestyles in either the public or private
sector, or both. Search of the Lambda Defense and Legal Education Fund Web site
<http://www.lambdalegal'org/cgi-bin/pages/documents/record?record=185 and record=217>
(visitedNov. 1998). See also Angela Gilmore, Employment Protectionfor Lesbian and Gay
Men, 6 LAW & SEx. 83 (1996) (exploring the legal claims open to lesbians and gay men
challenging employment discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and concluding
that emerging arguments such as those relying on "lifestyle protection" statutes are
effective); Kevin M. Cathcart, Welcome to Lambda 25! News & Views, Feb. 2, 1998 (found
on the Lambda Defense and Legal Education Fund Web site
<http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/pages/documents/record?record=203> (visited Nov.
1998) ("[a]s we celebrate our 25th anniversary nationwide in 1998, we are proud that
Lambda has become one of our community's key institutions .... With state and local
ordinances, constitutional interpretations, and an ever-growing body of civil rights case law,
lesbians and gay men today have protections that were unimaginable in 1973.")).
2 The political successes of gay-rights groups counter the powerlessness argument. For
a full discussion, see supra note 1.
3 See, e.g., Robert F. Nagel, Symposium: Romer v. Evans, Playing Defense, 6 WM &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 167 (1997) (determining that public perception of gay-rights success has
led to a backlash by the more silent moral majority). For a discussion of anti-discrimination
successes, see supra note 1.
4 See, e.g., Jonathan Pickhardt, Note, Choose or Lose: Embracing Theories of Choice in
Gay Rights Litigation Strategies, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 952-64 (1998) (claiming it is
encouraging that many homosexual activists are changing their strategy to arguments that
support acceptance of the gay lifestyle, not just tolerance).
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marriage.5
Supporters of traditional mores, however, have begun to fight back.6 The public
is responding to what it sees as an elitist court system that imposes its own liberal
morality onto the populace against their will.7 The opponents of such radical social
engineering by an un-elected few have responded with successful grass-roots
democratic efforts to thwart this attack on traditional morality and return this nation
' See, e.g., Samuel A. Marcosson The Lesson of the Same-Sex Marriage Trial: The
Importance of Pushing Opponents of Lesbian and Gay Rights To Their "Second Line of
Defense," 35 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 721 (1997) (arguing that opponents of same-sex
marriage cannot successfully argue morality as a basis for their beliefs and that second-line
defenses such as those used by the State of Hawaii in Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394-05, 1996
WL 694235 (Cir. Ct. Haw. Dec. 3, 1996), cannot succeed either). See also William N.
Eskridge, Jr, A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REv. 1419 (1993) (attempting to
justify the concept of same-sex marriage by examining its existence historically in some
cultures); Nancy J. Knauer Domestic Partnership and Same-Sex Relationships: a
Marketplace Innovation and a Less Than Perfect Institutional Choice, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 337 (1998) (arguing that the struggle for the recognition and protection of
same-sex relationships is at the forefront of the contemporary gay and lesbian civil rights
agenda and that some of the biggest successes of the gay-rights movement have come in
gaining partnership benefits for same-sex partners in businesses, colleges, and other
organizations).
6 See, e.g., Nagel, supra note 3, at 177-79 (arguing that popular referendums against
homosexual rights initiatives are a response of the public's perception of militant
homosexual rights organizations activities); see also Rev. Raymond C. O'Brien, Single-
Gender Marriage: a Religious Perspective, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REV. 429 (1998)
(arguing that it is time for religious opinions against same-sex marriage to be heard in the
homosexual rights debate).
' Nagel, supra note 3, at 171, finding that:
[I]t is odd in the extreme that either justices or professors should write as if a
sympathetic account of the people's purposes is either unimaginable or flimsy. The
oddness arises from the fact that no one should know better than these
constitutional lawyers what the voters in Colorado [or in this case Cincinnati] were
doing. The voters were... playing defense. This was--or should have been--
obvious to the legal establishment from the beginning, because no one plays
offense more aggressively than legal commentators and jurists .... My position
is not so much that the legal establishment has been blind to the concerns of a large
segment of their fellow citizens, as that it has resolutely closed its eyes.
[Vol. 32:4
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to its historic roots.'
This Note will examine one such effort by the citizens of Cincinnati and the
litigation that resulted from it in the case Equality Foundation of Greater
Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati.9 The general question presented by this Note
is the constitutionality of the public practicing democracy by popular referendum
by amending a city charter to negate previous legislation protecting gay, lesbian,
and bisexual persons from discrimination and prohibiting the city council from
passing any similar protections in the future.' ° This particular issue has not yet been
addressed or settled by the Supreme Court, and, because the Court has denied the
final writ of certiorari filed in this case," the Court may not decide this issue in the
near future, either. The Supreme Court did examine somewhat similar concerns in
Romer v. Evans, in which case the Court trumped popular will, overturning a
statewide constitutional mandate that removed homosexuals from a protected class
'Examples covered throughout this Note include the Colorado Amendment 2 initiative,
infra Part II.C., and Cincinnati's issue 3 initiative, infra Part LI.A. At the national level,
Congress responded to the threat that Hawaii might recognize same-sex marriage with The
Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (1996), [hereinafter DOMA] which was
signed by President Clinton and states that:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be
required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other
State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the
same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory,
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.
Id. For a general analysis of this act, see, e.g., Diane M. Guillerman, Comment, The Defense
of Marriage Act: The Latest Maneuver in the Continuing Battle to Legalize Same-Sex
Marriage, 34 Hous. L. REV. 425 (1997) (examining both the struggle for same-sex marriage
in the homosexual community, and the constitutionality of DOMA). See also Charles J.
Butler, Note, The Defense of Marriage Act: Congress's Use of Narrative in the Debate Over
Same-Sex Marriage, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 841 (1998) (looking at Congressional use of
narratives and rhetoric in the debate over DOMA); Kevin H. Lewis, Note, Equal Protection
After Romer v. Evans: Implications For The Defense of Marriage Act and Other Laws, 49
HASTINGS L.J. 175 (1997) (suggesting constitutional problems for DOMA due to the
Supreme Court Romer v. Evans decision).
9 838 F. Supp. 1235 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (temporary injunction granted); permanent
injunction granted, 860 F. Supp. 417 (S.D. Ohio 1994); rev'd, 54 F.3d 261 (6'b Cir. 1995);
vacated and remanded for rehearing, 518 U.S. 1001 (1996); rev'd, 128 F.3d 289 (6"b Cir.
1997); rehearing denied en banc, 1998 WL 101701 (6"h Cir. 1998); cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
365 (1998).
10 128 F.3d at 295.
" 119 S. Ct. 365.
1999]
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and prevented any such future designation. 12
Section II of this Note provides background about the issues in question,
examines the standards of review applied by the Federal Courts, and analyzes the
impact of Romer v. Evans on Equality.3 This Section will also review the major
Supreme Court and Circuit Court decisions that are applicable to Equality.4
Section M provides a case history of Equality.'5 Section IV provides an analysis
of the decisions with respect to the background information provided in Section II
and the analysis in the various courts. 6 Finally, Section V concludes that the courts
should abandon their elitist usurpation of democracy and allow the popular will to
determine the role of morality in the governance of a city, the political unit closest
to the people themselves. 7
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Impetus:
In 1991, the city of Cincinnati passed the Equal Employment Opportunity
Ordinance (EEO),'" which prohibited discrimination in city employment and
appointments to city boards and commissions based on, among other things, sexual
orientation.' 9 In 1992, Cincinnati expanded these protections with the Human
Rights Ordinance (HRO),2 ° which prohibited discrimination based on sexual
orientation in private employment, public accommodations, and housing.2
12 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (analyzed infra Part fl.C.)
13 See infra notes 18-68 and accompanying text.
14 id.
'" See infra noles 69-82 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 83-172 and accompanying text.
'7 See infra notes 173-181 and accompanying text.
18 Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417,
421 (S.D. Ohio 1994) [hereinafter Equality I].
'9 Id. Discrimination based upon sexual orientation, whether it be heterosexual, gay,
lesbian, or bisexual, is prohibited by the EEO. Id. The EEO also prohibits discrimination
based on race, color, sex, disability, religion, national or ethnic origin, age, HV status,
Appalachian regional ancestry, and marital status. Id.
2 0 d. at 421.
21 Id. Discrimination based upon sexual orientation, whether it be heterosexual, lesbian,
gay or bisexual, is prohibited by the HRO. Id. The HRO provides exemptions for fraternal
and religious organizations and expressly prohibits use of the ordinance to create
"affirmative action program eligibility." Id. Like the EEO, the HRO also prohibits
670 [Vol. 32:4
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In response to these laws, the organization "Equal Rights Not Special Rights"
began to gather the signatures of Cincinnati voters to place a Charter Amendment
on the ballot.22 This resulted in Issue 3, a voter referendum to amend the Cincinnati
City Charter by adding Article XII,23 which effectively rescinded the EEO and HRO
with respect to gay, lesbian, and bisexual anti-discrimination and proscribed the re-
enactment of any similar ordinances in the future.
24
B. Standard of Review:
The standard of review used to evaluate cases of group discrimination depends
upon the status of the group in question. 25 The courts have required strict scrutiny
analysis for laws that impact a suspect class, 26 such as a racially defined group.
discrimination based on race, color, sex, disability, religion, national or ethnic origin, age,
HIV status, Appalachian regional ancestry, and marital status. Id. The HRO provides civil
and criminal penalties for violators of its provisions. It also includes a severability clause.
Id.
22 Id. at 422.
23 Id. The Cincinnati Charter Amendment is printed here in full:
ARTICLE XII
No Special Class Status May Be Granted Based Upon Sexual Orientation,
Conduct or Relationships.
The City of Cincinnati and its various Boards and Commissions may not enact,
adopt, enforce or administer any ordinance, regulation, rule or policy which
provides that homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, status, conduct, or
relationship constitutes, entitles, or otherwise provides a person with the basis to
have any claim of minority or protected status, quota preference or other
preferential treatment.
This provision of the City Charter shall in all respects be self-executing. Any
ordinance, regulation, rule or policy enacted before this amendment is adopted that
violates the foregoing prohibition shall be null and void and of no force or effect.
Id. 24 Equality 1, 860 F. Supp. at 422. This amendment was approved by 62% of the voting
public. Id.
2' See, e.g., Renee Culverhouse & Christine Lewis, Homosexuality as a Suspect Class,
34 S. TEx. L. REV. 205, 210-11 (1993) (reviewing District Court and Circuit Court decisions
and the analysis for their holdings in cases of claimed discrimination against homosexuals);
see also Tracy T. Kenton, Note & Comment, Quasi-Suspect Status for Homosexuals in
Equal Protection Analysis: Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati,
12 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 873 (1996).
26 Culverhouse & Lewis, supra note 25, at 210-11 (footnotes removed):
Strict scrutiny, the Court's most exacting and searching review, occurs in two
different situations involving separate criteria. In the first instance, strict scrutiny
1999]
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Intermediate scrutiny is used for laws that impact a quasi-suspect class, such as a
group defined by gender. Homosexuals have never been given special class
protection by the Supreme Court nor by any Circuit Court that has examined the
issue.28 Thus, analysis of a law affecting homosexuals has traditionally used the
has protected individual interests from governmental interference when a
fundamental right is involved .... When a fundamental right is infringed upon the
Court must find that a compelling governmental interest is forwarded by the
legislation, or it will be considered unconstitutional. In the second instance, strict
scrutiny has been used when individuals are members of a class which forms a
"discrete and insular minority" which has been historically disadvantaged. When
a law discriminates against such politically powerless groups, the class is entitled
to the highest standard of review. The United States Supreme Court has
recognized race, alienage, and national origin as classifications deserving strict
scrutiny .... Race is considered the model example, and the Supreme Court has
dealt with race as a suspect classification on numerous occasions.
Id.
27 Id. at 209-10 (footnotes omitted):
Intermediate level review, or heightened review, was first recognized in Shapiro
v. Thompson [394 U.S. 618 (1969)] and requires that the governmental interest be
substantial and important to pass constitutional muster. This intermediate level of
review is most often found in two kinds of cases: (1) when a class of persons
comes close to meeting the criteria to establish them as a suspect class but fails to
meet fully the characteristics established by the Court; or (2) when persons assert
an interest which is very important but does not rise to the height of a fundamental
right. Classifications which do not receive the highest standard of review but
involve heightened scrutiny are referred to as quasi-suspect classes and have
included gender and illegitimacy .... Examples include cases involving women,
men, hippies, children of illegal aliens, and the mentally retarded.
Id. The elements for analyzing quasi-suspect class status are discussed in detail in Kenton,
supra note 25. The elements listed there are: 1) the group's status as a discrete and insular
minority; 2) the personal immutability of certain characteristics; 3) the risk that the
classification serves to stereotype and stigmatize; and 4) the political powerlessness of the
group. Id. at 877-78.
28 Culverhouse & Lewis, supra note 25, at 206 (reviewing the various United States
Circuit Court decisions regarding homosexual class status. Summarizing the various cases
involving claims of both military and private employment, the authors state that "at best,
cases involving sexual orientation are given active rational basis review.. . ."); see also
Sandy D. Baggett, Note, Constitutional Law--Suspect Class Status and Equal Access to the
Political Process Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment--Laws
Precluding Anti-Discrimination Legislation for Homosexuals Equality Foundation of
Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261 (6t Cir. 1995), 63 TENN. L. REV.
239, 249 (1995) ("Circuit court decisions over whether to apply strict scrutiny to legislation
[Vol. 32:4
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lowest scrutiny standard available: the default rational basis analysis.2 9 However,
the Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans30 may have changed this analysis slightly
when it found that homosexuals had been unconstitutionally targeted for special
treatment based on their group status, and that such discrimination was
unconstitutional .31
C. Romer v. Evans:
In a statewide referendum in 1992, the people of Colorado passed a state
constitutional Amendment 32 which was purported to prevent any governmental body
in the state from giving gays, lesbians, and bisexuals any special rights or
privileges.33 Supporters of this Amendment were attempting to counter what they
viewed as the militant political power of homosexual groups by negating legislation
and ordinances in Colorado that prohibited discrimination against homosexuals and
by preventing any future re-implementation of similar legislation.34
The Supreme Court in Romer found that the Colorado Amendment's broad
classifying by sexual orientation have uniformly declined to extend "suspect" class status
to homosexuals .. ").
29 See, e.g., Culverhouse & Lewis, supra note 25, at 209. ("Rational basis or rational
relationship review is the lowest level of review. It is most often used in economic or social
cases where the challenged regulation or law must be rationally related to the governmental
purpose the law is intended to serve.").
'0 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
3 For an analysis of Romer v Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), see infra Part H.C.
32 Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1338 (Colo. 1994). Amendment 2 provides:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation.
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any
of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact,
adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual,
lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute
or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or
claim any minority status quota preferences, protected status or claim of
discrimination.
Id.
33 Id.; see generally Nagel, supra note 3 (analyzing throughout as to the political
atmosphere and distributed materials in support of the Amendment).
34 See generally Nagel, supra note 3 (analyzing throughout as to why the people of
Colorado may have been responding to a feeling of political powerlessness against the
perceived threats of militant homosexuals when they passed Amendment 2, rather than
responding to personal prejudice or animus against homosexuals).
1999]
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language could be construed as prohibiting any government body in the state from
supporting any claim under color of law if the victim was a homosexual, thus
depriving homosexuals of rights aimed at the population in general. 35 Also, the
Supreme Court found that the Amendment took away most of the political power
of homosexuals as a group, preventing them from any possibility of success in
lobbying city or state government bodies for protection based on their homosexual
status.36 To gain any legislation designed to benefit homosexuals, the Court claimed
that homosexuals would have to mount a state-wide campaign to get their own
constitutional amendment passed, or else resort to the Federal government to
overcome the obstacles that the Colorado voters had put into their path.37
Homosexuals were thereby deprived of any recourse at the municipal levels, the
county levels, or even the state legislative and administrative levels of
government.38 In light of this, the Supreme Court found that this Constitutional
Amendment did not serve any rational government purpose.39
3' Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 630 (1996) ("[I]t is a fair, if not necessary, inference
from the broad language of the amendment that it deprives gays and lesbians even of the
protection of general laws and policies .... ). However, the Colorado Supreme Court found
no such threat in its analysis of the amendment. Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo.
1994). In his vigorous dissent, Justice Scalia takes issue with the majority's contentions.
Scalia, analyzing the Colorado Supreme Court decision, states that "general laws and
policies that prohibit arbitrary discrimination would continue to prohibit discrimination on
the basis of homosexual conduct." Romer, 517 U.S. at 638 (Scalia, A., dissenting) (citations
omitted). Justice Scalia further states that even the majority admits the only "denial of equal
treatment it contends homosexuals have suffered is this: They may not obtain preferential
treatment without amending the state constitution." Id.36 Romer, 517 U.S. at 627. The Court relies on the Colorado Supreme Court analysis by
quoting "[t]he 'ultimate affect' of Amendment 2 is to prohibit any government entity from
adopting.., protective statutes, regulations, ordinances, or policies [in future support of
gays and lesbians] unless the state constitution is first amended to permit such measures."
Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1284-85, n.26 (Colo. 1994).
" Romer, 517 U.S. at 627. For example, the Court states that gays and lesbians "can
obtain specific protection against discrimination only by enlisting the citizenry of Colorado
to amend the state constitution .. " Id. at 631. The court finds that "[h]omosexuals, by
state decree, are put in a solitary class with respect to transactions and relations in both the
private and governmental spheres. The amendment withdraws from homosexual, but no
others, specific legal protection from the injuries caused by discrimination, and it forbids
reinstatement of these laws and policies." Id. at 627.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 632-33, 635 (finding that the amendment itself was evidence of animus toward
a particular group). The Court also finds that the amendment was "at once too broad and
too narrow." Id. at 621. The amendment "imposes a special disability" upon homosexuals
674 [Vol. 32:4
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The Romer Court did not explicitly apply the traditional constitutional scrutiny
analysis4" to this case, claiming that it could not do so. 4 ' However, the Court
appears to have implicitly used "rational basis" analysis.4 2 By not explicitly
following the traditional scrutiny analysis, the resulting confusion leads some
commentators to claim that the court has ratified a new "fundamental right of gay
men, lesbians, and bisexuals to participate equally in the political process."43
alone while "it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests." Id. at 631-32. The
Supreme Court concludes that:
We cannot say that Amendment 2 is directed to any identifiable legitimate
government purpose or discrete objective. It is a status-based enactment ....
Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to
make them unequal to everyone else. This Colorado cannot do. A State cannot so
deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws.
Id. at 635.
'0 See supra notes 26-28.
4' Romer, 517 U.S. at 632. The Court states that "Amendment 2 fails, even defies [a]
conventional inquiry." Id. Yet, the court then states that the Amendment "lacks a rational
relationship to legitimate state interests" applying the very analysis that the Court claimed
it could not apply. Id.
42 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631- 33 (using the words "rational relationship" many times).
The Court also uses the terminology "legitimate government purpose" and "legitimate
purpose." Id. at 632, 635. These words imply a rational basis analysis. See also Equality
Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 294 (6th Cir. 1997)
[hereinafter Equality II1] ("The... Supreme Court [didn't use] strict. . . or intermediate
scrutiny standards, but instead ultimately applied rational relationship ....").
Some commentators have indeed found that the court implicitly used traditional analysis
without specifically saying so, most finding that the court used a rational basis test. See,
e.g., Andrea M. Kimball, Note, Romer v. Evans and Colorado's Amendment 2: The Gay
Movement's Symbolic Victory in the Battle for Civil Rights, 28 U. TOL. L. REv. 219, 223
(1996) ("The Court found Amendment 2 violated the lowest level of equal protection
scrutiny--the rational basis test."). But at least one commentator has found an implication
of quasi-suspect class status. Jerald W. Rogers, Note, Romer v. Evans: Heightened Scrutiny
Has Found a Rational Basis-is the Court Tacitly Recognizing Quasi-Suspect Status for
Gays, Lesbians, and Bisexuals?, 45 U. KAN. L. REv. 953,953 (1997) (claiming that "while
the Court purported to apply rational basis review, it instead applied a form of heightened
scrutiny because the Court has tacitly recognized--or is preparing to recognize--gays and
lesbians as a quasi- suspect class."). However, the extensive use of the word "rational" in
the Romer Court's analysis implies that a "rational basis" standard was used.
43 Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1343 (Colo. 1994). For a detailed, pre-Romer
analysis of the Colorado Supreme Court's reliance in Evans of a fundamental right to
participate in the political process, see Stephanie L. Grauerholz, Comment, Colorado's
1999] 675
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However, the Supreme Court makes it clear that it does not rely on such a new
fundamental right to decide this case,' and most commentators agree.4" Still, the
Supreme Court gives us little guidance on how to analyze similar cases.46 The
reality seems to be that the Court did apply the traditional class status analysis,
jumping right to the "rational basis" argument because, if the Amendment fails
there, the Court has no need to find a suspect or quasi-suspect class in order to
apply heightened scrutiny to invalidate the Amendment.47 The Court seems
desperate to invalidate this Amendment, finding it offensive on its face. 8 The
Amendment 2 Defeated: the Emergence of a Fundamental Right to Participate in the
Political Process, 44 DEPAUL L. REv. 841 (1995); see also Micah R. Onixt, Note, Romer
v. Evans: A Positive Portent of the Future, 28 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 593, 610 (1997) (stating that
"[a]lthough the Court has never expressly announced such a right, a series of cases appear
to demonstrate that the Equal Protection Clause guarantees a fundamental right to participate
equally in the political process" while at the same time ignoring the Romer Court's explicit
rejection of just such an argument).
44 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 626 (1996) (affirming the judgement on different
grounds).
4' See, e.g., Mark E. Papadopoulos, Note, Inkblot Jurisprudence: Romer v. Evans as a
Great Defeat for the Gay Rights Movement, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 165, 194-95
(1997) (finding that the Romer Court found no fundamental right to participate fully in the
political process); see also Teresa M. Bruce, Note, Neither Liberty nor Justice: Anti-Gay
Initiatives, Political Participation, and the Rule of Law, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 431,
433 (1996). ("The Court had an opportunity in Romer to affirm the Colorado Supreme
Court's finding that the [U.S.] Constitution protects a fundamental interest in equal
participation in the political process. But it declined to do so.").
46 The lack of guidance is apparent from the confusion among authorities in exactly how
to apply the Romer analysis to future cases. See, e.g., Papadopoulos, supra note 45, at 168
(saying that after Romer we are left with something of a paradox); see also Matthew Coles,
The Meaning of Romer v. Evans, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1343, 1635-36 (1997) (suspecting that
Romer will be of little significance to future cases). But see Onixt, supra note 43, at 596
(arguing that despite weaknesses in its rationale, Romer will help homosexual rights
advocates advance their cause).
47 See, e.g., Onixt, supra note 43, at 626 (the Romer Court used a rational basis review);
see also Papadopoulos, supra note 45, at 169 (courts will construe Romer as little more than
a rational basis review).
" Romer, 517 U.S. at 632-35. The court focuses on the existence of a "broad and
undifferentiated disability on a single named group" stating that the amendment's "shear
breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems
inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class that it affects ... ." Id. at 632. The
court also states that"[a] law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one group
of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal
[Vol. 32:4
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Court also short-cuts its analysis," concluding that the state has exceeded its bounds
by implementing this Amendment.5" Unfortunately, the Romer Court gives us no
guidance on how to apply its novel analysis to the issue at hand.5
In a vigorous dissent, 52 Justice Scalia makes it clear that one-third of the Court
finds that the Colorado Amendment easily passes the rational basis test,53 and that
this is the proper test for analyzing this situation.54 He decries the majority's novel
protection of the laws in the most literal sense." Id. at 633. And later the court remarks that
"Amendment 2 [makes] a general pronouncement that gays and lesbians shall not have any
particular protections from the law [thus inflicting] on them immediate, continuing, and real
injuries that outrun and belie any legitimate justifications that may be claimed for it." Id.
at 635.
49 At least one commentator feels that the Supreme Court's terse admonitions did not
show the Colorado population the respect that they deserved. Stating that "[e]specially if
the majority were inclined to avoid or minimize moral condemnation, it would have been
natural to canvas all ostensibly benign possibilities before concluding that an enactment
endorsed by more than half a million diverse citizens was motivated by animosity." Nagel,
supra note 3, at 169. Finally, he warns that:
[T]he national judiciary may be one of the significant causes of the kinds of anxiety
that prompted Amendment 2... these are all matters for which the courts and the
legal elite have some specific responsibility. Indeed, the Romer decision itself is
a rather direct indication of how lawyers help to make people feel cut-off from
government. Here is a decision that sets aside a popular initiative with hardly a
thought about the nature of the fears that drove it ....
Id. at 187-88. See also Richard F. Duncan, Wigstock and the Kulturkampf: Supreme Court
Storytelling, The Culture War, and Romer v. Evans, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV., 345, 369
(1997) ("In one of the most candid assessments of the Court and the legal system ever
written in a Supreme court opinion, Scalia [in his dissent] implied that traditionalists cannot
receive a fair hearing in litigation raising issues such as those in Romer").
50 The majority uses such descriptives as "its sheer breadth is discontinuous with the
reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable .. " Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
"It is at once too narrow and too broad." Id. at 634. "It is a status based enactment
divorced from any factual context from which we could discern a relationship to legitimate
state interests." Id. at 635.
"' See supra notes 46-50.
52 Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, A., dissenting).
53 Id. at 642. (comparing Romer to Bowers v. Hardwick, Justice Scalia writes that "If
it is rational to criminalize the conduct [of homosexuals], surely it is rational to deny special
favor and protection to those with a self-avowed tendency or desire to engage in the
conduct.").
54 Id. at 640-41.
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approach to this case55 and states that the Amendment would not result in any dire
consequences beyond its stated objective to prevent giving homosexuals "favored
status because of their homosexual conduct. 56
Analysis in this Note will show that the Cincinnati Charter Amendment, in
contrast to the Colorado Constitutional Amendment, is much narrower in its
political constraints, limiting homosexual groups' ability to get favorable anti-
discrimination support only at the municipal level.57 Thus, the two amendments can
be distinguished.5 8
" Id. at 640. Dissenting Justice Scalia states that:
there is no doubt of a rational basis for the substance of the prohibition at issue
here. The Court's entire novel theory rests upon the proposition that there is
something very special-something that cannot be justified by normal 'rational
basis' analysis-in making a disadvantaged group . . . resort to a higher
decisionmaking level. That proposition finds no support in law or logic.
Id.
56 Id. at 643.
57 Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261, 269 (6'
Cir. 1995) (citations omitted) (hereinafter Equality I). The Sixth Circuit, reviewing the
political impact of the Charter Amendment, concludes that:
The instant Amendment deprived no one of the right to vote, nor did it reduce the
relative weight of any person's vote. Pursuant to the Amendment, homosexuals
remained empowered to vote for City Council members and to lobby those Council
members concerning issues of interest. The only effect of the Amendment upon
Cincinnati citizens was to render futile the lobbying of Council for preferential
enactments for homosexuals qua homosexuals because the electorate placed the
enactment of such legislation beyond the scope of Council's authority .... The
Amendment does not impair homosexuals and other interested parties from seeking
to repeal the Amendment on another day through the same political process by
which Issue 3 became law .... In addition, gays, lesbians, and bisexuals may seek
relief through other political avenues and fora, such as the Ohio state legislature or
the United States Congress.
Id. See also Equality III, 128 F.3d 289, 297 (6" Cir. 1997).
" See infra Parts II.B. and IV.B.
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D. Bowers v. Hardwick:
The Supreme Court discussion in Bowers v. Hardwick59 is important whenever
one analyzes legislation that impacts homosexuals. 60 The Bowers Court
unambiguously held that a state had the power to criminalize a behavior that was
deeply embedded in the homosexual identity.61 The court held that the state of
Georgia had the constitutional and historical authority to criminalize homosexual
sodomy,62 that there was no fundamental right to engage in such behavior,63 and that
there was no privacy protection preventing the state from prosecuting such activities
occurring in a homosexual's own home.64 The Bowers decision has been used as
a prime authority to justify the withholding of suspect or quasi-suspect status from
homosexuals.65
E. The Circuit Courts:
The United States Circuit Courts, which have consistently applied traditional
scrutiny analysis, have unanimously found that homosexuals comprise neither a
" 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Practicing homosexual brought an action challenging the
constitutionality of Georgia's sodomy statute after he had been charged under that statute.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted defendant's
motion to dismiss for failure to state claim upon which relief could be granted, and plaintiff
appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. 760 F.2d 1202 (11 th Cir. 1985).
After rehearing was denied defendants petitioned for certiorari. The Supreme Court held
that Georgia's sodomy statute did not violate the fundamental rights of homosexuals.
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186.
60 See, e.g., Kenton, supra note 25, at 887-98 (stating that most courts have held that the
decision in Bowers bars any equal protection claim by homosexuals); see also Culverhouse
& Lewis, supra note 25, at 218-39 (examining the reliance of the Circuit Courts on Bowers
for their denial of quasi-suspect class status for homosexuals).
61 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-92 (no constitutional right for homosexual to engage in
homosexual sodomy); Id. at 194 (the criminalization of sodomy is deeply rooted in our
nations history); see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,640 (1996) (Scalia, A., dissenting).
Justice Scalia states that "in Bowers v. Hardwick we held that the Constitution does not
prohibit what virtually all States had done from the founding of the Republic until very
recent years-- making homosexual conduct a crime." Id. (citations omitted).62 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 189-96.
63 Id. at 191 ("respondent would have us announce... a fundamental right to engage in
homosexual sodomy. This we are quite unwilling to do.").
64 Id. at 195 (finding no support for a constitutional protection for the act of sodomy in
the privacy of one's home).
65 See generally Culverhouse & Lewis, supra note 25.
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suspect nor a quasi-suspect class.66 Although much commentary concludes that
homosexuals should be considered at least a quasi-suspect class,67 the authority is
lengthy and clear that, with no exceptions, homosexuals are entitled only to a
rational basis review of suspect, discriminatory legislation.68
66 See, e.g., Culverhouse & Lewis, supra note 25, at 218-40.
61 See, e.g., Culverhouse & Lewis, supra note 25, at 239-49; see also Baggett, supra note
28, at 252.
68 Culverhouse & Lewis, supra note 25, at 218-39 (analyzing many Circuit Court
decisions all of which deny homosexuals any special class status); see, e.g., Pruitt v.
Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160 (9t Cir. 1991) (holding that a discharge based on an officer's
acknowledged status as a homosexual did not run afoul of the First Amendment even though
the acknowledgment came in newspaper article); United States Information Agency v. Krc,
905 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (affirming the dismissal of a case challenging the discharge
of a homosexual from the United States Information Agency for security concerns based on
the employee's homosexuality); Dubbs v. Central Intelligence Agency, 866 F.2d 1114 (9"
Cir. 1989) (holding that there was evidence supporting the district court's conclusion that
an employee's discharge due to homosexuality was rationally related to a legitimate
government security interest in collecting foreign intelligence and protecting the nation's
secrets); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that an
officer's homosexuality was not protected by a constitutional right to privacy and that the
Navy's practice regarding homosexual discharges was rationally related to a permissible
government end); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that the FBI's
refusal to hire lesbian plaintiff did not violate equal protection because homosexuality is not
a suspect or quasi-suspect classification and the FBI's conclusion that homosexual conduct
could adversely affect agency's responsibilities was rational); Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d
1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that the Navy's policy of mandatory discharge for
homosexual conduct does not violate constitutional rights to privacy or equal protection).
However, the District Courts decisions aren't quite so unanimous, although any counter
holdings have been reversed by the Circuit Courts. See, e.g., Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 489 F.
Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980), rev'd, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that the First
Amendment rights of a sergeant were not violated by application of regulation making
admitted homosexuality a disqualification to a sergeant's re-enlistment, that the deferential
rational basis standard of review was applicable and that the regulation did not violate equal
protection rights of sergeant) cert. denied sub nom. 494 U.S. 1004 (1990); High Tech Gays
v. Defense Indust. Security Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1987), rev'd in
part, vacated in part 895 F.2d 563 (9"h Cir. 1990) (holding that homosexuals do not
constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class and are not entitled to greater than rational basis
scrutiny under equal protection, that denial of a secret security clearance based on
applicant's disclosures regarding his homosexual activity did not violate free association
rights, and that the policy was rationally related to Government's legitimate interest in
protecting national secrets). But see Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9" Cir.
1989) (holding that the Army was stopped from barring re-enlistment solely because of
serviceman's acknowledged homosexuality where the serviceman had been completely
680 AKRON LAW REVIiEW [Vol. 32:4
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11. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statement of the Facts:
On November 8, 1993, six days after the passage of Issue 3 by a 62% voter
majority in the city of Cincinnati, the Plaintiffs69 made a motion for the issuance of
a preliminary injunction, which was granted.7" The plaintiffs also filed a lawsuit in
the District Court,71 challenging the constitutionality of Issue 3.72 After hearing the
case, the court made findings of fact, 73 found the Charter Amendment
candid about his homosexuality from the start of his Army career, and the Army, with full
knowledge of his homosexuality, had repeatedly permitted serviceman to re-enlist in the
past).
69 The Plaintiffs were: Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc., (an Ohio not-for-
profit corporation whose purpose is the achievement of "equality" for all individuals');
Richard Buchanan (a gay man residing in Cincinnati); Chad Bush (a gay man who has a
pending charge of discrimination in public accommodations under the Cincinnati HRO);
Edwin Greene (an African-American gay man who is a resident of the City of Cincinnati);
Rita Mathis (an African-American lesbian who resides in the City of Cincinnati); Roger
Asterino (a gay man employed by the City of Cincinnati who has a pending charge of
discrimination under the City's EEO); and Housing Opportunities Made Equal (H.O.M.E.)
(civil rights organization with diverse membership). Equality 1, 860 F. Supp. 417, 423-24
(S.D. Ohio 1994).
70 Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 838 F. Supp. 1235
(S.D. Ohio 1993). The District Court found that the plaintiffs met the burden required for
the issuance of a preliminary injunction, namely 1) a strong or substantial likelihood or
probability of success; 2) a showing of irreparable harm; 3) the lack of substantial harm to
others; and 4) that the public interest would be served by issuing this preliminary injunction.
Id. at 1238. The question of how it was in the public's best interest to issue this injunction
when the public had just made their interests known by city-wide referendum was not
addressed by the court. Also, the court based its likelihood of success on the existence of
a right "to participate equally in the political process" a right that had never been recognized
by the Supreme Court of the United States, nor any circuit court. See infra Part IV.A.3.
71 Equality I, 860 F. Supp. 417.
72 See infra Part IV.
73 Equality 1, 860 F. Supp. at 426-27. The relevant findings of fact by the District Court,
many of which are challenged in this Note using a number of reliable authorities, are:
1) Homosexuals comprise between 5% and 13% of the population. 2) Sexual
orientation is a characteristic which exists separately and independently from
sexual conduct or behavior. 3) Sexual orientation is a deeply rooted, complex
combination of factors including a predisposition towards affiliation, affection, or
bonding with members of the opposite and/or the same gender. 5) Sexual behavior
is not necessarily a good predictor of a person's sexual orientation. 6) Gender non-
conformity such as cross-dressing is not indicative of homosexuality. 8) Sexual
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unconstitutional on all grounds raised by the plaintiffs,74 and permanently enjoined
the implementation and enforcement of the proposed Charter Amendment known
as Article XII.
75
orientation is set in at a very early age--3 to 5 years--and is not only involuntary,
but is unamenable to change. 9) Sexual orientation bears no relation to an
individual's ability to perform, contribute to, or participate in, society. 10) There
is no meaningful difference between children raised by gays and lesbians and those
raised by heterosexuals. Similarly, children raised by gay and lesbian parents are
no more likely to be gay or lesbian than those children raised by heterosexuals. 11)
There is no correlation between homosexuality and pedophilia. Homosexuality is
not indicative of a tendency towards child molestation. 12) Homosexuality is not
a mental illness. 13) Homosexuals have suffered a history of pervasive, irrational
and invidious discrimination in government and private employment, in political
organization and in all facets of society in general, based on their sexual
orientation. 14) Pervasive private and institutional discrimination against gays,
lesbians and bisexuals often has a profound negative psychological impact on gays,
lesbians and bisexuals. 15) Gays, lesbians and bisexuals are an identifiable group
based on their sexual orientation and their shared history of discrimination based
on that characteristic. 16) Gays, lesbians and bisexuals are often the target of
violence by heterosexuals due to their sexual orientation. 17) In at least certain
crucial respects, gays, lesbians and bisexuals are relatively politically powerless.
18) Coalition building plays a crucial role in a group's ability to obtain legislation
in its behalf. Gays, lesbians and bisexuals suffer a serious inability to form
coalitions with other groups in pursuit of favorable legislation. 19) No Federal laws
prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. Furthermore, voter back-lash
around the country has lead to the repeal of numerous laws prohibiting
discrimination against gays, lesbians and bisexuals. In 38 of the approximately
125 state and local communities where some sort of measure prohibiting
discrimination based on sexual orientation has been adopted, voter initiated
referendums have been placed on the ballot to repeal those gains. 34 of the 38
were approved. 20) The amount of resources spent by the City on processing and
investigating discrimination complaints by gays, lesbians and bisexuals is
negligible. City resources spent on processing and investigating all sexual
orientation discrimination complaints is negligible. 21) The inclusion of protection
for homosexuals does not detract form the City's ability to continue its protection
of other groups covered by the City's anti-discrimination provisions. 22)
Amending the city charter is a far more onerous and resource-consuming task than
is lobbying the City Council or city administration for legislation; it requires a city
wide campaign and support of a majority of voters. City Council requires a bare
majority to enact or adopt legislation.
Id.
7 4 See infra Part IV.
7 Equality 1, 860 F. Supp at 449.
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B. The Appeals:
The result was appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, 76 which vacated
the injunction, reversing the District Court on all grounds.77 The plaintiffs appealed
to the Supreme Court, which vacated and remanded to the Circuit Court for further
consideration in light of Romer v. Evans.78 On reconsideration, the Sixth Circuit
distinguished the Cincinnati Charter Amendment from the Colorado Constitutional
Amendment,7 9 again vacating and reversing on all grounds.8 ° Subsequently, the
76 Equality 1I, 54 F.3d 261 (6 h Cir. 1995).
77 Id. The court found that: (1) neither the First Amendment nor equal protection applied
to private discrimination; (2) gays, lesbians, and bisexuals constitute neither a suspect class
nor quasi-suspect class; (3) there is no fundamental right to equal participation in the
political process; (4) the charter amendment did not unconstitutionally reduce the relative
weight of person's vote nor impair any right to petition the government; (5) the charter
amendment was rationally related to permissible public purposes; and (6) the charter
amendment was not unconstitutionally vague. Id.
78 518 U.S. 1001 (1996). Justice Scalia, in a dissent joined by two other Justices,
strongly distinguishes the two cases when he writes that:
Romer involved a state constitutional amendment prohibiting special protection for
homosexuals. The consequence of its holding is that homosexuals in a city (or
other electoral subunit) that wishes to accord them special protection cannot be
compelled to achieve a state constitutional amendment in order to have the benefit
of that democratic preference. The present case, by contrast, involves a
determination by what appears to be the lowest electoral subunit that it does not
wish to accord homosexuals special protection. It can make that determination
effective, of course, only by instructing its departments and agencies to obey
it-which is what the Cincinnati Charter Amendment does. Thus, the consequence
of holding this provision unconstitutional would be that nowhere in the country
may the people decide, in democratic fashion, not to accord special protection to
homosexuals. Unelected heads of city departments and agencies, who are in other
respects (as democratic theory requires) subject to the control of the people, must,
where special protection for homosexuals are concerned, be permitted to do what
they please. This is such an absurd proposition that Romer, which did not involve
the issue, cannot possibly be thought to have embraced it.
Id. at 1001 (Scalia, A. dissenting).
79 Equality 111, 128 F.3d 289, 297-98 (6h Cir. 1997). The Sixth Circuit distinguishes the
Cincinnati amendment from the Colorado amendment:
At bottom, the Supreme Court in Romer found that a state constitutional proviso
which deprived a politically unpopular minority, but no others, of the political
ability to obtain special legislation at every level of state government, including
within local jurisdictions having pro-gay rights majorities, with the only possible
recourse available through surmounting the formidable political obstacle of
securing a rescinding amendment to the state constitution, was simply so obviously
and fundamentally inequitable, arbitrary, and oppressive that it literally violated
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Sixth Circuit denied a petition to rehear the case en banc.8 ' The Supreme Court has
denied the plaintiffs' writ of certiorari.82
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Traditional (pre-Romer) Analysis:
1. Introduction:
This section will show that the District Court's opinion lacked any critical
analysis of the plaintiff's positions,8 3 and that the court's opinion blatantly ignores
legal precedent and dismisses out of hand the defendants' arguments.' The Sixth
basic equal protection values. Thus, the Supreme Court directed that the ordinary
three-part equal protection query was rendered irrelevant ....
This "extra-conventional" application of equal protection principles can have
no pertinence to the case sub judice. The low level of government at which Article
XII becomes operative is significant because the opponents of that strictly local
enactment need not undertake the monumental political task of procuring an
amendment to the Ohio Constitution as a precondition to achievement of a desired
change in the local law, but instead may either seek local repeal of the subject
amendment through ordinary municipal political processes, or pursue relief from
every higher level of Ohio government including but not limited to Hamilton
County, state agencies, the Ohio legislature, or the voters themselves via a
statewide initiative.
Moreover, unlike Colorado Amendment 2, which interfered with the expression of
local community preferences in that state, the Cincinnati Charter Amendment
constituted a direct expression of the local community will on a subject of direct
consequences to the voters. Patently, a local measure adopted by direct franchise,
designed in part to preserve community values and character, which does not
impinge upon any fundamental right or the interests of any suspect or quasi-suspect
class, carries a formidable presumption of legitimacy and is thus entitled to the
highest degree of deference from the courts ....
As the product of direct legislation by the people, a popularly enacted
initiative or referendum occupies a special posture in this nation's constitutional
tradition and jurisprudence. An expression of the popular will expressed by
majority plebiscite, especially at the lowest level of government (which is the level
of government closest to the people), must not be cavalierly disregarded.
Id. See also supra note 78 (where three Supreme Court Justices, dissenting from
the grant of certiorari in this case, also distinguish the Colorado Amendment from
the Cincinnati Amendment).
'o Equality III, 128 F.3d 289 (6t Cir. 1997).
81 1998 WL 101701 (6h Cir. 1998).
82 Applicationfor writ: 66 USLW 3749 (May 4, 1998) denied by 119 S. Ct. 365 (1998).
83 See infra Part IV.
84 Id.
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Circuit obviously agrees with this assessment in its thorough chastisement of the
District Court by completely and summarily reversing every single ground on which
the District Court bases it's decision.85 This Note will examine the findings of the
District Court in turn.
86
2. Strict Scrutiny:
Strict Scrutiny has been applied by the Supreme Court and the Circuit Courts
only to cases of racial discrimination or where a fundamental right is involved. 7
The District Court, therefore, creates a new "fundamental right to equal
participation in the political process" 8 to justify its application of strict scrutiny to
the Amendment. The District Court fashions this new innovative right8 9 by
erroneously reading Washington v. Seattle School Dist.,9° Hunter v. Erickson,9' and
Gordon v. Lance.92 The court improperly analogizes that since those cases involved
interference with political rights of a minority group, this then implies a general
prohibition against ever implicating those rights for any identifiable minority
5 Equality 11, 54 F.3d 261,266 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated and remandedfor rehearing, 518
U.S. 1001 (1996). The Sixth Circuit describes the District Court's rulings in an incredulous
tone as "novel" and "misconstru[ing]," that "courts should resist tailoring novel rights." Id.
The court also found that the District Court "erroneously fashioned [an] innovative right."
Id. See also Equality III, 128 F.3d at 292.86 See infra Part IV.
87 See supra note 25.
88 Id.
89 Equality 11, 54 F.3d at 268; see also Equality II1, 128 F.3d at 292.
90 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (holding that a statute, adopted through initiative, which prohibits
school boards from requiring any student to attend a school other than the school
geographically nearest or next nearest his place of residence, but which contains exceptions
permitting school boards to assign students away from their neighborhood schools for
virtually all purposes required by their educational policies except racial desegregation
violates the equal protection clause because it uses the racial nature of an issue to define the
governmental decision making structure, thus imposing substantial and unique burdens on
racial minorities).
" 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (holding that an amendment of city charter to provide that any
ordinance enacted by city council which regulates use, sale, advertisements, transfer, listing
assignment, lease, sublease, or financing of realty on basis of race, color, religion, national
origin, or ancestry must first be approved by majority of electors violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution).
92 403 U.S. 1 (1971) (holding that requiring 60% of voters in referendum election to
approve bonded indebtedness or tax increases does not violate the equal protection clause
merely because votes of those who favor issuance of bonds have proportionately smaller
impact on outcome of election than votes of those who oppose issuance of bonds).
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group.93 If such a fundamental right existed, the District Court could apply strict
scrutiny to the Amendment and bypass the traditional class status analysis
altogether.94 The District Court conveniently overlooks that all of the cited cases
involve a minority that has already been granted special protections by the courts,
namely racial minorities.95 The District Court erroneously creates this new
fundamental right despite clear precedent to the contrary.96 The Supreme Court has
also subsequently rejected any such fundamental right in Romer v. Evans.97
3. Heightened Scrutiny:
The District Court determined that gays, lesbians, and bisexuals meet the criteria
for quasi-suspect group status, and, thus, are entitled to heightened (intermediate)
scrutiny whenever the government potentially infringes on any of their rights,9"
despite clear precedent to the contrary from every Circuit Court that has addressed
the issue.99 The District Court attempted to overcome this obstacle by evaluating
the elements used to determine the existence of quasi-suspect group status in a way
at odds with the very same analysis of the Circuit Courts.' ° The five elements that
93 Equality 1, 860 F. Supp. 417, 433-34 (S.D. Ohio 1994) ("We therefore conclude that
Issue 3 implicates the Plaintiffs' Fundamental Right to equal participation in the political
process by singling out and disadvantaging an independently identifiable group of citizens--
gays, lesbians and bisexuals--by making it more difficult for that group to enact legislation
in its behalf. As we conclude that Issue 3 implicates a Fundamental Right, it must be
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest or it must fall.").
94 See supra note 26.
95 See supra notes 26, 90-92.
96 See infra Part H.C. The Sixth Circuit says:
[I]n Hunter, the Court strictly scrutinized, and struck down, a voter- adopted
amendment to the Akron City Charter which foreclosed the city council from
legislating any race-based prohibition against discrimination in private housing
without the prior authorization of a majority of the voters. The Hunteropinion was
anchored in the "suspect classification" of race, not in any averred fundamental
right to lobby the city council for favorable legislation .... Likewise, Washington,
in which the high Court invalidated a state voter approved initiative which was
designed to preclude bussing of students to achieve racial desegregation, turned
upon a suspect racial classification .... Finally, Gordon involved the recognized
fundamental right to vote, not an all-inclusive asserted right to participate fully in
the political process.
Equality II, 54 F.3d at 268 (citations omitted).
97 See infra Part II.C.
98 Equality I, 860 F. Supp. at 434-40.
99 See generally Culverhouse & Lewis, see supra note 25 (providing a list of cases and
their holdings).
'00 See infra Part H.E.
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the District Court chooses to evaluate quasi-suspect status are consistent with the
traditional analysis °10 and will be evaluated in turn.
10 2
(a) Whether an individual's sexual orientation bears any relationship to his or
her ability to perform, or to participate in, or contribute to, society. "3 There is no
doubt that gays, lesbians, and bisexuals can contribute to society; however, what
must be shown is that there is no evidence that being gay, lesbian, or bisexual has
any negative bearing on an individual's ability to function in society.114 The District
Court concludes that homosexuality has no impact on an individual's societal
performance.0 5 Yet, there are numerous studies that imply that homosexuals as a
group are at an increased risk for a number of physical and mental disabilities.0 6
For example, homosexuals are more likely than the general population to get
AIDS, 10 7 to commit suicide,'0 8 they live shorter lives"° and they suffer to a greater
extent from drug and alcohol abuse. 10 The very act of anal sodomy, common
101 See supra note 17.
'02 Equality 1, 860 F. Supp. at 436. The elements are covered individually, see infra Parts
IV.A.3.(a)-(e).
103 Equality 1, 860 F. Supp. at 436; see also supra note 73, findings of fact 9, 10, 11 &
12.
'04 Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 310-11 (1976) (where the
court declined to apply heightened scrutiny because it found that "there is a general
relationship between advancing age and decreasing physical ability .. ").
105 Canmermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910, 922 (W.D. Wash. 1994) ("[T]here is no
study showing [homosexuals] to be less capable or more prone to misconduct."). This case
deals with a specific individual in a military job, as differentiated from the situation in
Equality where the impact of homosexuality in general must be evaluated across a wide
range of circumstances and employments. Thus the cases are distinguishable.
'0o See supra notes 107-110.
107 JEFFREY SATINOVER, M.D., HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE POLITICS OF TRUTH 15-16
(1996) (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome [AIDS] was first known as "Gay Related
Immune Disorder" because of its predominance in male homosexual populations. Eighty-
five percent of AIDS patients in the United States are either homosexuals or IV drug users).
See also CHARLES W. SOCARIDES, M.D. HOMOSEXUALITY, A FREEDOM Too FAR 236
(1995).
10Id. at 294 (finding that "a U.S. task force on Youth Suicide reported in 1989 that gay
adolescents may account for as many as 30 percent of youth suicides each year .... [But]
the actual figure may be closer to ten percent.").
'09 Id. at 273 (stating that one U.S. Study places the number of male homosexuals that
reach the age of 55 at only 3 percent).
"0 SOCARIDES, supra note 107, at 68 (finding that "[h]omosexual males are three times
as likely to have alcohol or drug problems as the general male population.").
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practice among gays, is likely to lead to a number of diseases and disabilities."'
Therefore, it may be fair and prudent that an employer take a person's sexual
orientation into account in determining whether that person qualifies for a particular
job. The Sixth Circuit Court did not, however, address this particular issue. 112
(b) Whether the members of the group have any control over their sexual
orientation."' This element can be easily confused with the "immutability" element
examined next, and they are indeed similar." 4 The District Court differentiates
sexual activity from sexual orientation," 5 and makes the outrageous claim that
sexual activity is not even a good predictor of sexual orientation. 1 6 However, the
1' See, e.g., id. at 24 (noting that [Anal sex] causes bleeding lacerations of the intestine
and tearing of the sphincter muscle and anal mucosa. Sometimes anal sex reaches all the
way up into the sigmoid colon, which can lead to a fatal infection of the peritoneum.); see
also SATINOVER, supra note 107, at 67 (determining that "gay males have a disproportionate
incidence of acute rectal trauma as well as of rectal incontinence and anal cancer ....
Comparable tears in the vagina are not only less frequent because of the relative toughness
of the vagina [thicker], but the environment of the vagina is vastly cleaner than that of the
rectum .... As a result, homosexual men are disproportionately vulnerable to a host of
serious and sometimes fatal infections caused by the entry of feces into the bloodstream.").
1" Equality II, 54 F.3d 261 (6h Cir. 1995); see also Equality III, 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir.
1997). The Sixth Circuit only pays cursory attention to the elements of the District Court's
quasi-suspect status analysis because the Sixth Circuit relies primarily on the holdings of
other Circuit Courts and on Bowers to deny heightened review.
" Equality 1, 860 F. Supp. 417, 436 (S.D. Ohio 1994). See also findings of fact 2, 3, 6
& 8, supra, note 73.
114 This Note will assume that by this element the court means that a person does not
choose his or her sexual orientation. Therefore, the discussion, infra Part IV.A.3.c, applies.
"' The District Court credits the testimony of witnesses with establishing this point,
stating that "[c]redible and unrebutted testimony established that sexual orientation sets in
at an early age, around 3-5 years, and is simply a matter of development beyond that stage
.... Equality 1, 860 F. Supp. at 437. The court claims that the "evidence amply
established, and we conclude, that there is a broad distinction between sexual orientation,
and sexual conduct .... Sexual orientation, as Dr. Gonsiorek put it, 'is a predisposition
toward erotic, sexual, affiliation or affection relationship towards one's own and/or the other
gender,' and is not simply defined by any conduct." Id. at 424.
"6 Id. ("In fact, evidence demonstrated that sexual activity is not even necessarily a good
predictor of one's sexual orientation .... Thus, while sexual conduct may be a matter of
volition, sexual orientation is not. Sexual orientation is therefore not simply a matter of who
one chooses to have sex with, but rather is a much deeper, more complex and involuntary
state of being."). Contra, see, e.g., Pickhardt, supra note 6, at 954 ("Adopting choice-
affirming arguments instead of choice-denying arguments would not only affect the attitudes
of non-gay people toward people who are gay, it would also affect how gay people
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argument as to whether homosexuality is defined by conduct has been extensively
examined by the courts, with the courts deciding that the behavior is an integral part
of the identity." 7 As a matter of practical application, there can be no difference
between the two because a homosexual is usually identified by his behavior'" and
because there are no consistent distinguishing characteristics or traits." 9 The
concepts of sexual "desires" and "fantasies," devoid of behavior to anchor them into
a sexual "orientation," are much too ethereal for a meaningful legal discussion, and
the courts have largely ignored any difference. 20 The Sixth Circuit takes the view,
as do most courts, that homosexuality and bisexuality are defined by behavior, and,
themselves view being gay .... In addition to perpetuating bigoted attitudes outside our
community, the claims of having no choice in our sexual orientation exact a great cost on
our own community's self-esteem.").
117 Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (stating that
homosexuality is primarily behavioral in nature and as such is not immutable); see also
Pickhardt, supra note 6, at 943:
Even if it were scientifically proven that sexual orientation is fixed and
unchangeable, such orientation could arguably only be manifested through
conscious action, and conscious action as a product of volition can never be
immutable. Thus, the description of sexual orientation as "primarily behavioral in
nature" becomes impossible to disprove since the only means of identifying
someone as gay is through his or her behavior.
Id. But see Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910, 919 (W.D. Wash. 1994) ("[P]laintiff
has also provided the Court with substantial uncontroverted evidence that a distinction
between homosexual orientation and homosexual conduct is well grounded in fact.").
118 Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1076 ("Homosexuality, as a definitive trait, differs
fundamentally from those defining any of the recognized suspect or quasi-suspect classes.
Members of recognized suspect or quasi-suspect classes, e.g., blacks or women, exhibit
immutable characteristics, whereas homosexuality is primarily behavioral in nature."). See
also High-Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573
(9t ' Cir. 1990).
" 9 Nan D. Hunter, Comment, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 VA. L. REV. 1695, 1718
(1993) ("Self-identifying speech ... is a major factor in constructing identity.... That is
even more true when the distinguishing group characteristics are not visible, as is typically
true of sexual orientation. Therefore, in the field of lesbian and gay civil rights . ..
expression is a component of the very identity"). See also Equality 11, 54 F.3d 261, 267 (6"'
Cir. 1995).
120 See, e.g., Equality 11, 54 F.3d at 267 ("The reality remains that no law can successfully
be drafted that is calculated to burden or penalize, or to benefit or protect, an unidentifiable
group or class of individuals whose identity is defined by subjective and unapparent [sic]
characteristics such as innate desires, drives, and thoughts."). See also Equality II1, 128
F.3d 289, 292(6th Cir. 1997). But see Equality I, 860 F. Supp. at 424 ("Sexual orientation
is distinct from, and exists wholly independently of, sexual behavior or conduct.").
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because a person can choose whether or not to engage in such behavior, sexual
orientation is a choice as well.
12 1
There are authorities who believe that sexual orientation is, in some cases, a
choice, 22 and a number of homosexuals have confirmed that they consciously chose
their sexual orientation.23 Because it cannot be generally said that homosexuals
have no control over their sexual orientation, the District Court was in error to
conclude that homosexuality is not a choice.
124
(c) Whether sexual orientation is an immutable characteristic. 125 The District
Court concludes that homosexuality is an immutable characteristic, despite contrary
findings by Circuit Courts across the country. 26 The District Court basis its results
on a number of faulty conclusions, such as homosexuals cannot be converted to
heterosexuality 127 and homosexuality is not behavioral. 28 The Sixth Circuit,
121 Equality 11, 54 F.3d at 267. See also Equality III, 128 F.3d at 292; Woodward, 871
F.2d at 1076; and Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454,463-64 (7th Cir.1989) (finding that
a lesbian orientation is compelling evidence that the plaintiff has engaged in homosexual
conduct and likely will do so again).
122 See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique
of the Argumentfrom Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 516-28 (1994) (arguing that gay
rights litigators should abandon choice-denying arguments based on biological causation in
favor of arguments that take no stance on causation at all). See also Pickhardt, supra note
6, at 943 (arguing that it is time that the gay rights movement take up a "choice affirming"
strategy in legal arguments and discrediting much of the scientific basis for a genetic basis
of sexual orientation, stating that "even if it were scientifically proven that sexual orientation
is fixed and unchangeable, such orientation could arguably only be manifested through
conscious action, and conscious action as a product of volition can never be immutable..
. the only means of identifying someone as gay is through his or her behavior.");
SOCARIDES, supra note 107, at 18-19 (arguing that some fraction of male homosexuals,
which he calls 'optional homosexuals,' chooses his homosexuality because he 'likes it.').
123 See, e.g., VERA WHISMAN, QUEER BY CHOICE: LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND THE
PoLrrics OFIDENTITY (1996) (including testimonials of homosexuals who claim their sexual
orientation was their choice).
124 See supra, notes 119-123.
'2i Equality 1, 860 F. Supp. at 436; see also supra note 73, findings of fact 2, 3, 5, & 8.
'
26 See, e.g., Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1076 (quotation supra note 118).
127 Equality I, 860 F. Supp. at 424. For example, witness Dr. John Gonsiorek provided
testimony that "sexual orientation is an involuntary status, that it sets in at an early age, that
it is unamenable to techniques designed to change it (which he described as unethical), and
also that sexual orientation is distinct from, and exists wholly independently of, sexual
behavior or conduct." Id. But see SOCARIDES, supra note 107, at 113-55 (claiming that his
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however, declined to find homosexuality immutable; instead it relied on extensive
Circuit Court precedent. 129 The Sixth Circuit determined that "[b]ecause
homosexuals generally are not identifiable 'on sight' unless they elect to be so
identifiable by conduct, 130 they cannot constitute a suspect class or a quasi-suspect
class because 'they do not exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing
characteristics that define them as a discrete group. ' "131 Many commentators have
examined this issue, but there is no consensus on the immutability of
homosexuality. 32 In addition, many sources claim that because, at least
occasionally, homosexuality is a choice, it is not generally immutable. 133 Finally,
arguments that homosexuality is genetically based, and thus immutable, have
proven less than convincing.13 ' The scientific studies that the press has portrayed
as proving a "gay gene" have been derided by some authorities as based on
imperfect science and have, therefore, been rejected by many in the scientific
community. 135 Thus, the evidence has not proven that sexual orientation is
success rate in treating homosexuals so that they live heterosexual lifestyes is as good as,
or better, than the psychiatric professions success rate at treating any mental disorder). See
also SATINOVER, supra note 107, at 168-209 (discussing the success rates of both secular
and Christian treatments which convert homosexuals to a heterosexual lifestyle).
121 See supra notes 117-127.
'29 Equality H, 54 F.3d 261, 266 (6h Cir. 1995). See also Equality III, 128 F.3d 289, 293
(6" Cir. 1997).
130 This includes public displays of homosexual affection or self-proclamation of
homosexual tendencies.
131 Equality II, 54 F.3d at 267 (quoting Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602, (1987)).
See also Equality II, 128 F.3d at 293.
132 See SATINOVER, supra note 107, at 22 ("[A]s the recent survey The Social
Organization of Sexuality makes clear, the vast majority of youngsters who at some point
adopt homosexual practices later give them up." See also supra note 127.
133 See supra notes 122-123.
'34 Pickhardt, supra note 6, at 946-48 ("[T]he scientific studies, on their own terms, are
not proof that being gay is not a choice"). See also Halley, supra note 122, at 529-46
(critiquing both the manner that the scientific studies were done and the results thus
inferred).
131 See supra note 134. See also SATINOVER, supra note 107, at 37-38 ("Recent articles
in the media create the mistaken impression that scientific closure on the subject of
homosexuality soon will be reached.., but the scientific consensus [that homosexuality is
immutable] that the press touts is a fiction .... In contrast to the widely promoted claims,
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immutable. 36 This is, in fact, the finding of those Circuit Courts that have
examined the issue.
1 37
(d) Whether that group has suffered a history of discrimination based on their
sexual orientation. 138 The District Court concludes that "gays, lesbians and
bisexuals have suffered a history of invidious discrimination based on their sexual
orientation.' 139 However, a history of discrimination alone has never been
sufficient to implicate heightened scrutiny.1 4° The existence of discrimination
merely starts the analytical process.'
(e) Whether the class is "politically powerless. " 42 The district court determined
that gays, lesbians, and bisexuals are politically powerless by finding that "it is
crucial for political minorities to form coalitions in order to achieve legislative
success"'143 concluding that "[p]laintiffs, while not a wholly politically powerless
group, do suffer significant political impediments."' 44 The Sixth Circuit does not
specifically address this issue. 4 5 However, homosexuals actually have very
powerful political advocates, and they have, in fact, succeeded in forming
successful coalitions with other minority groups to their mutual political benefit.' 46
136 See supra notes 115-134.
137 See supra note 68.
'
31 Equality I, 860 F. Supp. 417,436 (S.D. Ohio 1994). See also supra note 73, findings
of fact 13, 14, 15 & 16.
139 Equality 1, 860 F. Supp. at 436.
140 See, e.g., Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("[A]fter
Hardwick it cannot logically be asserted that discrimination against homosexuals is
constitutionally infirm"). See also David L. Chambers, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage,
26 HOFSTRA L. REv. 53 (1997) (examining the legally protected discrimination against
polygamists in comparison to prohibitions against same-sex marriage).
141 See supra note 27.
142 Equality , 860 F. Supp. at 436. See also supra note 73, findings of fact 17, 18, 19 20,
21 & 22.
143 Equality 1, 860 F. Supp. at 438.
1 Id. at 437. See the testimony of John Burlew (an attorney with local political
experience) and Kenneth Sherrill (a professor of political science at Hunter College). Id. at
425. See also the testimony of Professor James Woodward (professor of political science
at Clemson University). Id. at 426.
'
4 See generally Equality II, 54 F.3d 261 (6" Cir. 1995); See also Equality II1, 128 F.3d
289 (6" Cir. 1997).
'4 For example, homosexual rights are supported by the American Civil Liberties Union
[ACLU], <http://www.aclu.org/issues/gay/hmgl.html> (visited Nov. 1998). The ACLU web
site also shows that the ACLU was active in supporting the effort to overturn the Cincinnati
Charter Amendment. <http://www.aclu.org/news/wl 12197c.html> (visited Nov. 1998).
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The District Court concludes that the plaintiffs had met the requirements of
quasi-suspect class status.1 47 The Sixth Circuit subsequently reversed and held that
the plaintiffs were not a member of a quasi-suspect group. 4
4. First Amendment Vagueness.
The District Court accepts the plaintiffs' arguments that the Charter Amendment
violates their First Amendment rights to free speech and association, 149 as well as
impinges on their right to petition the government for a redress of grievances. 5 '
The District Court assumed that Issue 3 would "hinder the 'unfettered interchange
of ideas for the bringing about of political and social change" 151 and, thus, infringe
upon the First Amendment.'5 2 However, the Sixth Circuit rejects this conclusion,
The National Organization for Women [NOW] also supports homosexual rights, as a
search of their web site shows. See <http://www.now.org/issues/lgbi/index.html > (visited
Nov. 1998). The NOW site also states that "NOW is the largest feminist organization in this
country working for lesbian rights" <http://www.now.org/issues/lgbi/lesbian.html> (visited
Nov. 1998).
Even the Democratic National Committee supports gay rights, as a search of their web
site reveals. See <http://www.democrats.org/dnews/98preleases/pr080498.html> (visited
Nov. 1998) (criticizing the Republican party for its lack of support for gay & lesbian rights).
With the support of these and other powerful lobbying and political organizations, it is
difficult to argue that gays, lesbians, and bisexuals are politically powerless. In fact, the
opposite is shown.
147 Equality 1, 860 F. Supp. at 435-37.
141 Equality 11, 54 F.3d at 266. There, the court states:
In declaring [that homosexuals were entitled to quasi-suspect status], the lower court
in the instant case misconstrued Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) The
Bowers Court directed that the courts should resist tailoring novel fundamental
rights. Id. at 195. Since Bowers, every circuit court which has addressed the issue
has decreed that homosexuals are entitled to no special constitutional protection, as
either a suspect or a quasi-suspect class, because the conduct which places them in
that class is not constitutionally protected.
Id. See also Equality III, 128 F.3d at 292.
149 Equality I, 860 F. Supp. at 444-45.
50 Id. at 440.
' Id. at 445 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
112 Id. at 446. The District court states that:
The consequences of attempting to supersede Issue 3 are prohibitive of any attempt
to do so, carrying with defeat--a likely consequence due to the Plaintiffs' numerical
inferiority and unpopularity--the exorbitant risk of employment and housing
discrimination. The social and political stakes associated with requiring an
unpopular group to seek anti-discrimination legislation from the majority, therefore,
are unique and patently unfair. Such a situation will chill political expression in a
way and to a degree not inherent in other subjects properly relegated to the initiative
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finding that there was no infringement of First Amendment rights.'53 Likewise, the




The District Court does little to analyze any possible rational basis for the
Amendment, instead issuing a terse conclusion that "[a]fter carefully considering
the asserted governmental interests articulated by the Defendants, and any other
possible justifications, we conclude that Issue 3 is not rationally related to any
process. This will have the "inevitable effect of reducing the total quantum of speech
on a public issue."
Id. (citations omitted).
"' Equality H, 54 F.3d at 270. The court states that:
First Amendment rights of free speech and association, and their right to petition the
government for redress of grievances. Equality I, 860 F. Supp. at 444-47. This
reviewing court rejects that conclusion. The Amendment erected no official obstacle
to the exercise of anyone's free speech or free association rights. The Amendment's
forbearance from prohibiting private citizen discrimination against homosexuals for
public homosexually oriented speech or association is constitutionally
nonproblematic because the First Amendment prohibits only governmental burdens
upon speech and association; it does not command the government to insulate any
person from the effects of private action resulting from the exercise of free speech
or association rights.
Id. See also Equality III, 128 F.2d at 297:
Patently, a local measure adopted by direct franchise, designed in part to preserve
community values and character, which does not impinge upon any fundamental
right or the interests of any suspect or quasi-suspect class, carries a formidable
presumption of legitimacy and is thus entitled to the highest degree of deference
from the courts.
Id.; see also Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7t Cir. 1989):
Ben-Shalom is free under the regulation to say anything she pleases about
homosexuality and about the Army's policy toward homosexuality. She is free to
advocate that the Army change its stance; she is free to know and talk to
homosexuals if she wishes. What Ben-Shalom cannot do, and remain in the Army,
is to declare herself to be a homosexual. Although that is, in some sense speech, it
is also an act of identification. And it is the identity that makes her ineligible for
military service, not the speaking of it aloud. Thus, if the Army's regulation affects
speech, it does so only incidentally, in the course of pursuing other legitimate goals.
Id. at 462.
154 The Romer Court never even cites the First Amendment, and the dissent cites the First
Amendment once, as background material, and only in reference to religion. Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 637 (1996) (dissent). The author could find no article reviewing
Romer that even referenced the First Amendment with respect to the case.
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legitimate governmental purpose. ' 155 The Sixth Circuit analysis makes it clear,
however, that there are rational government and societal interests involved here,
such as associational liberties, freedom from government coercion, and savings to
taxpayers. 56 In addition to the objectives the defendants argued before the courts,
commentators and authorities have identified other legitimate purposes that
legislation like the Cincinnati Charter Amendment would serve, such as protection
for the nuclear family, restricting marriage to male/female couples, and upholding
traditional moral values. 157 For example, current research makes clear that children
155 Equality 1, 860 F. Supp. 417, 441 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
156 Equality 11, 54 F.3d at 270-71. The Sixth Circuit concludes that:
The trial court also erroneously ruled that the Amendment did not rationally relate
to any permissible public purpose. However, to the contrary, the Amendment
potentially furthered a litany of valid community interests. It encouraged enhanced
associational liberty on the part of Cincinnati residents respecting the sexual
orientation issue by eliminating exposure to the punishment mandated by the Human
Rights Ordinance against certain persons who elected to disassociate themselves
from homosexuals... [T]he measure reduced governmental regulation of the private
social and economic conduct of Cincinnati residents, and augmented the degree of
personal autonomy and collective popular sovereignty legally permitted concerning
deeply personal choices and beliefs which are necessarily imbued with questions of
individual conscience, private religious convictions, and other profoundly personal
and deeply fundamental moral issues. In turn, this public dichotomy decreased
municipal supervision of private conduct, which necessarily may result in some cost
savings for the City's taxpayers. These values, and others, were at least arguably
advanced by the Amendment ... this court cannot say that the Amendment was not
rationally related to a legitimate state objective.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Equality III, 128 F.2d at 293-294.
117 See generally O'Brien, supra note 6 (arguing that same-sex marriage is one of the
current goals of the gay-rights movement and that religions should play a role in the battle
against same-sex marriage.). Traditional moral values have a strong basis in logic:
[m]an's nature, undisciplined by values, will allow sex to dominate his life and the
life of society .... Societies that did not place boundaries around sexuality were
stymied in their development. The subsequent dominance of the Western world can,
to a significant extent, be attributed to the [original] sexual revolution, initiated by
Judaism and later carried forward by Christianity.
SATINOVER, supra note 107, at 17-18 (quoting Dennis Prager, Judaism, Homosexuality, and
Civilization, Ultimate Issues 6, no.2 (1990) p.2). Some liberal activists directly deride
traditional moral values held by the majority of Americans, protesting their use in
developing public policy: "[1]iberal theorists such as John Rawls ... demand that notions
regarding values based on assessments of what is a good and decent life be excluded from
the formulation of public policy, and more importantly, from the definition of a right."
Carlos A. Ball, Moral Foundations for a Discourse on Same-Sex Marriage: Looking
Beyond, 85 GEo L.J. 1871, 1877 (1997). See also Mary Becker, Women, Morality, and
Sexual Orientation, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 165, 189-90, 203-07 (1998) (calling the
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are suffering from the breakup of the nuclear family, and that this is negatively
impacting society as a whole. 58
B. Post Romer Analysis:
Because of the lack of guidance given by the Romer court in its opinion, it is
difficult to predict precisely what affect the Romer decision will have on the
analysis of legislation that impacts specific groups. 159 Yet, it is clear that Romer has
neither defined new rights nor a new protected class.' 6 Rather, Romer seems to
stand for the proposition that a state has no rational basis for excluding
homosexuals from political recourse at all levels of state government for leaving as
the only resort an amendment to the state constitution.
161
The Cincinnati Charter Amendment, in contrast, is aimed at the lowest form of
government in a state, the municipal level.162 There is far less interference in the
political process, and homosexual groups have recourse to county and state levels
of government to petition for special preferences.163 In addition, homosexuals can
resort to a public referendum as the supporters of the Charter Amendment did'
61
Federal remedies are also available. 65 Thus, the intrusiveness of the Charter
Amendment is minimized because it affects only the lowest level of government and
allows homosexuals recourse at many higher levels of government.'
66
The Sixth Circuit Court agrees, distinguishing the Cincinnati Charter
Amendment with the Colorado State Constitutional Amendment. 67 The Sixth
heterosexual sexual relationship "selfish" and "boring" and full of "discomfort" for the
woman, determining that "[m]ost heterosexual relationships continue to be relationships of
injustice and inequality" and generally concluding that lesbian relationships are superior to
heterosexual relationships).
158 See, e.g., Nancy Garland, Report Finds Half Nation's Kids at Risk; Panel Stresses
Importance of Two Parent Families, Bangor Daily News, (Oct. 17, 1996) (reviewing the
U.S. Commission on Child and Family Welfare Report: Parenting Our Children: In the Best
Interest of the Nation-finding that the breakup of the traditional family is harming the
nation's children, and thus harming society as well).
9 See infra Part ll.C.
160 id.
161 id.





167 Equality III, 128 F.3d 289, 296-301 (6h Cir. 1997) (stating that the Cincinnati
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Circuit did not find Romer applicable to a city charter amendment, and stuck to its
original analysis. 168 The court found that the Cincinnati Amendment was more
narrowly tailored, and, thus, it did not have the potential to be construed as
prohibiting homosexuals from exercising legal protections of a general nature.' 69
Such was a definite worry of the Romer Court about the Colorado Amendment. 7 '
The Sixth Circuit also found that the Cincinnati Amendment was rationally related
to legitimate government interests.
171
The dissenting Justices in Romer agree that the Cincinnati Amendment is not
affected by the Romer decision. 172 Therefore, it seems clear that the Cincinnati
Amendment is far less intrusive than the Colorado Amendment, and the Romer
decision should not be construed as preventing a city, or the residents of a city, from
implementing an ordinance or charter amendment that restricts the city government
from implementing anti-discrimination policies against homosexuals. 173 Finally, the
Supreme Court has denied the plaintiffs' writ of certiorari for Equality.
174
V. CONCLUSION
A City Charter Amendment, passed by the residents of the City of
Cincinnati in the exercise of their democratic rights, which prohibits the city from
passing any ordinances or implementing any policies that prohibit discrimination
against homosexuals, is rationally related to legitimate government purposes and
does not infringe upon the right of any protected group. 171
amendment did not disempower homosexuals from attaining special protection from all
levels of state government, but merely removed municipally enacted special legislation).
1681 d. at 298-99. Romer should not be construed to forbid local, municipal electorates
from withholding special rights or privileges from homosexuals. Id.
11 Id. at 296. The Cincinnati Charter Amendment, by merely preventing homosexual
from obtaining special priviledges and preferences, has a more restricted reach than the
Colorado Amendment, which could be construed to exclude homosexuals from the
protection of every Colorado State law. Id.
170 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 630 (1996).
171 Equality 11, 128 F.3d at 293-94 ("[T]he Cincinnati Charter Amendment advanced a
variety of valid community interests, including enhanced associational [sic] liberty for its
citizenry, conservation of public resources, and augmentation of individual autonomy
imbedded in personal conscience and morality. Thus, Article XII satisfied minimal
constitutional requirements").
172 Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 518 U.S. 1001
(1996).
173 Equality 111, 128 F.3d 289 (6 th Cir. 1997).
174 119 S. Ct. 365 (1998).
171 See infra Part IV.
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Romer v. Evans does not provide a rationale to invalidate such an amendment
because the Cincinnati Charter Amendment affects only the lowest form of
government, and, thus, it allows homosexuals to resort to county, state, and national
levels of government for relief.176 Therefore, the Amendment passes constitutional
scrutiny and should stand.'77
The citizens of Cincinnati, as well as those of other cities, should be allowed to
practice grass-roots democracy through public referendums. 178 The People have the
right to uphold the traditional mores that this nation was founded on without court
interference. 179 As Alexander Hamilton proclaimed: "The courts must declare the
sense of the law; and if they should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of
JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally be the substitution of their pleasure
to that of the legislative body."' 0 Federal courts should not unconstitutionally
usurp the legislative functions of governments, 181 and popular democracy deserves
a special deference from the courts in a democratic nation such as ours, if
democracy itself is to survive.
Robert F. Bodi
176 id.
177 Equality II1, 128 F.3d 289 (6" Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 365 (1998); see also
supra Part IV.
178 See Equality, 518 U.S. at 1001 (Scalia dissenting) (supporting the concept of popular
democracy restricting the exercise of special privileges and rights). See also Romer, 517
U.S. at 636 (dissent) (calling the Colorado voter's exercise of their democratic rights "a
modest attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores
against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise those mores through use of the
laws.").
179 See supra note 178. See also supra notes 79, 156, 158 and 171.
180 Hamilton, quoted from Federalist #78, found at <http://www.the-federalist-
society.org/Documents/Federalist Papers/federalist-78.htm> (visited Jan. 1999).
181 See, e.g., Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 44-45 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (finding that
"this Court has the necessary authority to order a tax increase to finance that portion of the
desegregation plan"). But see U.S. CONST. Art. I §7. (giving sole authority to raise revenue
to the United States Congress) and see U.S. CONST. amend. X (reserving to the States or the
people those powers not granted to the Federal Government).
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